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Abstract: We describe the flows of aid after large catastrophic natural disasters by using the 
extensive record of bilateral aid flows, by aid sector, available through the OECD’s Development 
Assistance Committee. For each large donor, we identify the extent of cross-sector re-allocation 
that is occurring in the aftermath of large disasters whereby humanitarian aid increases but 
other types of aid may decrease. Our evidence suggests that the expectation of large surges in 
post disaster aid flows is not warranted given the past diversity of experience of global foreign 
aid by donor and by event. We find no evidence, however, that donors reallocate aid between 
recipient countries (cross-recipient reallocation). These observations suggest that countries 
which are predicted to face increasing losses from natural disasters in the coming decades (and 
almost all are) should be devoting significant resources for prevention, insurance, and 
mitigation. 
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 The January 2010 earthquake in Haiti generated unprecedented promises of 
international aid from private charities, non-governmental organizations, governments, and 
multilateral organizations. These aid pledges and the promise of a new Port-au-Prince were 
widely seen as an opportunity for Haiti to ‘turn a corner’, ‘build back better’, and improve its 
development path in spite of the horrific destruction and tremendous loss of life. At the end of 
2012, according to the UN Special Envoy to Haiti office, only 62% of the funding promised by 
official (bilateral and multilateral) sources in the NY donor conference held in March 2010 has 
been disbursed. According to most observers, a significant number of people in Port-au-Prince 
still reside in temporary tent-like structures in camps for the displaced, some of the rubble has 
not yet been cleared, the cholera epidemic that was introduced into Haiti by UN forces has 
wreaked havoc on the health and lives of many, and the outlook for the reconstruction of 
Haiti’s capital city is clearly not as rosy as the initial descriptions of the Special Envoy’s office 
seemed to predict.1 
Here, we raise several questions regarding the inflows of post-disaster aid and their 
impacts. We want, primarily, to describe post-disaster aid flows in some detail, and within the 
context of total foreign aid flows. We quantify post-disaster aid, identify its nature and 
dynamics and examine its importance to the receiving countries as part of their overall 
reception of foreign assistance. We view this description as a first step in examining the efficacy 
of foreign aid. 
As far as we could find, no one has ever looked at these issues systematically, in spite of 
their obvious importance. Even a tabulation of the extent of post-disaster aid that is typically 
forthcoming after catastrophic disasters is difficult given the possibilities that aid pledges are 
very different from amounts actually disbursed, and much of what is disbursed is re-labeled aid. 
Becerra et al. (2012) examine the importance of post-disaster aid surges in relation to the 
amount of incurred damages. Here, we only examine large catastrophic events, and describe 
the ways in which these events affect total aid flows, and the aid’s components. We try to avoid 
                                                             
1 See for example, the descriptions in Katz (2013). 
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some of the difficulties in identification by exploiting the detailed bilateral data available 
through the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the OECD body responsible for tracking 
aid flows. We describe, separately for each of the largest donors, their disbursements of post 
disaster aid, and in particular the extent of cross-sector and cross-country re-allocation that is 
occurring in the aftermath of large disasters and their attendant promises of aid. 
Our evidence suggests that the expectation of large surges in post disaster aid flows is 
not warranted given the current configuration of global foreign aid; especially for countries 
facing big losses from natural disasters. Moreover, we do not find evidence that in the 
aftermath of catastrophic natural disasters, donors reallocate aid between recipient countries 
(cross-recipient reallocation). These observations suggest that countries which are predicted to 
face increasing losses from natural disasters in the coming decades (and almost all are) should 
be devoting significant resources for prevention, insurance, and mitigation.2  In terms of the 
humanitarian response to natural disasters, we find some evidence that donor countries 
provide humanitarian assistance by reallocating aid that was previously provided to other 
sectors (cross-sector reallocation). This observation leads us to conclude that research efforts 
that rely only on data for humanitarian assistance are mis-measuring the amount that affected 
countries receive in the aftermath of disasters.  
 The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we review the related literature in order 
to place our contribution in context. Next, in section 3, we discuss the data in some detail, and 
introduce some stylized facts on post-disaster aid flows by donor. In section 4, we provide panel 
VAR estimates of the magnitudes in question. Finally, we conclude with caveats, a policy 




                                                             
2 See the general discussion in Noy (2012) and the estimates for the Haiti 2010 earthquake damages versus its aid 
inflows (Cavallo et al., 2010). 
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2. The Previous Literature 
2.1 Aid 
The academic literature examining foreign aid is very large, and hardly presents a unified 
consensus on almost any related issue. An extensive recent survey of this literature, Temple 
(2010), outlines many of the current debates regarding recent trends in aid flows, the 
importance of debt relief as aid, the theory behind aid flows and their impact on economic 
growth, the actual evidence about the efficacy of aid, problems associated with aid flows such 
as Dutch Disease (a deterioration in the terms-of-trade caused by foreign inflows), crowding-
out of private and public sector investment, governance failures associated with aid (a variant 
of the resource curse), the problems connected to volatility and unpredictability of aid flows, 
and principal-agent problems (and the conditionality imposed to overcome them). All of these 
issues have their own research streams and all do not have any emerging consensus associated 
with them – see for example Clemens et al. (2012) for a recent description of the various views 
regarding aid effectiveness, the evolution of this literature, and the inherent difficulties in 
reaching any generalizable insights.  
Remarkably, Temple’s (2010) very extensive survey is silent about post-disaster aid, 
even though the visibility of post-disaster aid in public discussion is quite high, and much of the 
fund-raising of non-governmental organizations providing foreign aid is tied to funding requests 
in the aftermath of well-publicized catastrophes. 
Much of the most recent development research involves the analysis of specific aid 
projects and the implementation of randomized control trials (RCT). A specific recent emphasis 
is the introduction of programs to strengthen institutions, and in particular institutions that 
enhance community involvement in the development process. For example, Casey et al. (2012) 
examine a program to increase community-driven development in Sierra Leone. Again, much of 
this recent research does not involve the specific context of disaster relief and reconstruction 
aid. Leaving aside questions about external and internal validity, we believe that more RCT 
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projects whose aim is to assess the effectiveness of aid in post-disaster rehabilitation and 
recovery environments are also required.3  
2.2 Emergency Disaster Aid 
Few papers examine post-natural-disasters aid flows. Yang (2008) uses hurricane intensity data 
and concludes that official foreign aid increases significantly after disasters; for the developing 
countries in his sample, 73 percent of disaster damages are ultimately covered by aid inflows.4 
David (2011), in contrast, examines a similar question but with a different empirical approach. 
He finds that aid does not seem to increase after climatic disasters, and their increase following 
geological ones is delayed and very small.5  Becerra et al. (2012) also attempt to quantify the 
magnitude of the post-disaster aid surges using a broader sample and data from different 
sources, and conclude that these are typically much smaller than the estimated magnitude of 
the destruction.  
Most of the papers that examine the determinants of aid flows focus on the supply side, 
and in particular on the hypothesis that foreign aid is affected by geo-strategic interests– 
mostly focusing on the United States—e.g., Drury, Olson and Van Belle (2005), Fleck and Kilby 
(2010) and Becerra et al. (2012).6 In addition to the external geo-strategic considerations, 
Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) find that the amount of aid given after a disaster is influenced 
by domestic news coverage of the disaster in the donor country.  
Beyond these supply factors guiding aid allocations, Olsen, Carstensen and Høyen (2003) 
note that demand factors (i.e., the receiving country’s characteristics), and in particular its 
readiness to absorb new flows through NGOs, are important in determining aid inflows in 
general. On the other hand, they find little evidence that documented policy effectiveness by 
the receiving government and the presence of efficient institutional capacity to implement aid 
                                                             
3 The only RCT trial on post-disaster aid that we are aware of is De Mel et al. (2012). 
4
 Yang’s sample is concentrated in a few island nations, the countries of Central America, and two big countries 
that frequently experience storm damage, Bangladesh and the Philippines. 
5 Both papers attempt to estimate the impact of disasters on financial flows more generally.  
6 Bearce and Tirone (2010) show that these differences in geo-strategic interests also lead to differences in the 
efficacy of aid. 
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projects matter for the magnitude of aid received (though this may vary by the nature of the 
donating source; see Easterly and Pfutze, 2008).  
This literature also hypothesizes that there is significant cross-country re-allocation (as 
total aid budgets are politically more difficult to increase than to change the identity of 
recipients), and that there is cross-sectoral re-allocation (as post disaster humanitarian aid is 
frequently re-labeled aid that was already previously promised in other guises). Here, we would 
like to examine all these possibilities using the most comprehensive and detailed available data 
on bilateral aid flows. 
 
3. Data 
3.1 CRS Aid data 
Detailed data on aid flows are available from the Credit Report System (CRS) of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and from the United Nations’ Financial Tracking 
Service (FTS). The CRS data on official development assistance cover annual bilateral aid 
extended from 27 donor countries to a large number of recipient countries. The FTS database 
does not aggregate aid flows annually but rather presents information for each international 
humanitarian aid appeal issued by the UN. Many of these appeals involve natural disasters. 
The FTS data have two advantages: First, they provide data for each appeal separately, 
hence allowing direct one-to-one correspondence between aid flows and individual disasters. 
Second, while the CRS focuses only on OECD donor governments and multilateral organizations, 
the FTS also tracks aid flows from several large private/NGO donors. However, FTS data are 
based on donors’ voluntary reporting and evidence suggests it mis-estimates the volume of 
actual new aid given (see Becerra et al., 2012). We use the CRS dataset because of its more 
comprehensive nature and because it is based on actual disbursements rather than pledges or 
commitments. Only the CRS data allows us to answer the questions we pose here on the nature 
of realized post-disaster aid flows. 
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The CRS dataset includes the aid originating from the 25 members of the development 
assistant committee (DAC), 29 multilateral institutions, and 2 Non-DAC countries (Kuwait and 
United Arab Emirates) between 1973 and 2011. CRS records comprehensive information about 
bilateral and multilateral donors’ Official Development Assistance (ODA), including donor and 
recipient identification data, basic description of the amount, channel of delivery, purpose of 
the aid activity, and some supplementary data. The basic unit of observation in the CRS dataset 
is the aid activity, which according to the OECD definition, includes “projects and programs, 
cash transfers, deliveries of goods, training courses, research projects, debt relief operations 
and contributions to non-governmental organizations.” To be classified as an aid activity, an 
activity must met the OECD definition for ODA, which is that the activity has as its aim “the 
promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries, and which are 
concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent.”7 Each aid activity is 
reported by the donor agency, and includes detailed information about the amount committed 
and disbursed, characteristics and purposes.  
One central issue in the analysis of the CRS data is their comprehensiveness. In the past, 
some aid activities were not reported in the CRS, and so the conclusions based on the CRS data 
may not be accurate describing the trends in the overall aid activity of DAC countries. It is 
therefore necessary to assess to what extent we can use the data recorded in the CRS. The 
completeness of CRS data is measured by the coverage ratio, which we compute by adding the 
appropriate flows recorded in the CRS dataset and comparing them to their aggregate 
counterparts recorded in the aggregate statistics’ DAC dataset, which has the official figures of 
total aid activities by donor and recipient.  
 
                                                             
7 In the CRS, there is additional information about other official flows – the Other Official Flows (OOF). These do 
not meet the ODA criteria, and represent a minor share of the total official assistance and we consequently will not 
include them in the rest of the analysis. 
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We compute the coverage ratio for the total commitments and disbursements of grants 
and loans, and humanitarian aid disbursements.8 Figure 1 shows the computed coverage ratio 
for the period 1995 – 2011. Commitment information is highly comprehensive (i.e. it covers 
more than 90% of the whole commitment information) from 2000 onwards, whereas CRS 
disbursements and humanitarian aid information reached a high coverage only after 2002. In 
what follows, we focus on aid from DAC countries to developing countries between 2002 and 
2011 (the high coverage period).9 
The CRS dataset has five sections: identification data, basic data on the activity 
(description, destination, recipient, type, and channel), supplementary data (long narrative 
description and policy objective), volume data related to the activity (commitments, tying 
status, gross disbursements, and repayments of loans), and for loans, details on financial terms 
and amounts outstanding. The most relevant fields in the first three sections are discussed 
below.  
3.1.1. Aid Commitment Data 
The basic CRS data contain information about the recipient country, the aid flows’ channel of 
delivery and information about the purpose of the project, such as the description and purpose 
of the aid activity.10 Between 2002 and 2011, CRS identifies 160 developing countries as 
recipients of ODA aid activities. The main recipients are countries located in the Sub-Saharan 
Africa, South and Central Asia, Far East Asia, and Middle East with an average share of 31.1, 
16.3, 10.2, and 9.1 percent of the total commitments between 2002 and 2011. When 
comparing commitments classified as humanitarian aid, the largest share of aid is focused on 
countries located South of the Sahara with 39.6 percent of the total, followed by South and 
Central Asian countries (18.5 percent), and the Middle-East (12.7 percent). One important 
                                                             
8 Humanitarian aid is defined as the “assistance designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect 
human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. To be classified as humanitarian, aid should be 
consistent with the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence.” (See the 
Guidelines for Reporting In CRS++ Format) 
9 AidData (www.aiddata.org) includes data on other donors besides the CRS data on DAC donors. However, 
AidData focuses on commitments rather than on disbursements, and given the documented gap between the two, 
we prefer to use the CRS data directly (see Tierney et al. 2011). 
10 A summary of the main features of the commitment data is presented in Appendix Table 1. 
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feature of this disaggregation is the high share of the unspecified bilateral aid category: 14.7 
percent of the total commitments are classified in this category (12.7 percent for humanitarian 
aid). 
At the country level, aid commitments are concentrated in a few countries: between 
2002 and 2011, one third of the total aid is concentrated on ten countries, and almost 50 
percent of the humanitarian aid was directed to ten countries. The description of the purpose 
and sector of the aid activities is one of the most important fields for our purposes. The OECD 
asks donors to classify their aid activities according to the purpose that donors specify, using a 
broad sector classification and a particular subclass. The major part of the commitments is 
dedicated to social infrastructure and services (38.4 percent of the total between 2002 and 
2011), followed by economic infrastructure and services (15.4 percent), and action relating to 
debt (9.7 percent).  
For humanitarian aid, there are three main subsectors that in turn have their own 
purpose. Between 2002 and 2011, the average number of activities is 8,521 activities per year. 
Out of the total of humanitarian aid, Emergency Response is the sector that represents the 
most common activity, with around 83 percent of total commitments. Inside the emergency 
response sector, the main purpose is emergency relief, which accounts for 56 percent of the 
total humanitarian aid between 2002 and 2011, followed by emergency food aid (25 percent).11  
The CRS dataset also includes information about the type of financing, with two main 
categories: grants and loans. Grants represent around 77 percent of the total commitments, 
whereas the remaining 23 percent is for loans. Not surprisingly, grants represent around 97 
percent of the total humanitarian aid. The United States, Japan, Germany, France, United 
Kingdom and Netherlands are the most important donors, and together represent 75 percent 
                                                             
11 While we do not use this information, the CRS dataset also includes information about the type of channel used 
to deliver the aid—there are five broad groups: the public sector, NGOs, public-private partnerships (PPPs), 
multilateral organizations, and others. Information about channel is only available for half of the total aid activities 
after 2004, with a higher coverage after 2007. 
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of the total commitments among the DAC countries. For humanitarian aid, the United States, 
United Kingdom, Japan, Netherlands, and Canada are the main donors.12 
Finally, although commitments and disbursements are closely tied, actual 
disbursements tend to be lower than the original ODA commitments. Table 1 presents the 
average and standard deviation of the disbursement to commitment ratio for the largest six 
donor countries (France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States) 
and the largest multilateral donor (European Union Institutions) between 2002 and 2011. For 
each country, disbursements represented roughly about 90 percent of the total commitments 
with a standard deviation of about 20 percentage points. The main differences between the 
disbursement and commitment data occurred in the United Kingdom and EU Institutions, 
mainly caused by large deviations in particular years.13 
3.1.2. Aid Disbursement Data 
In light of the significant discrepancies between aid commitment and disbursement data, we 
focus on the latter. We started with the CRS database, covering the period 2002 - 2011. The 
dataset includes information of 1,746,431 aid activities in this period, but only 1,567,379 
records include information about disbursements. Almost all of the records come from the 25 
DAC countries (1,193,057 records) and 29 multilateral institutions14 (372,073). We focused only 
on the activities classified as ODA grants. They account for the main share of the total aid 
                                                             
12
 Since Iraq and Afghanistan are two of the main recipients of aid, however, the role of United States and United 
Kingdom may be overestimated. For non-DAC countries, CRS coverage is negligible: only two countries have 
information on aid activities for 2009 – 2011, and their commitments represent 1.1% of the total commitments. 
Amongst the multilateral institutions, the main donor is the category EU institutions, which accounts for 35 
percent of the multilateral organizations’ total commitments and the total humanitarian aid recorded in the CRS 
between 2002 and 2011. The other important multilateral donor reported in the CRS dataset is the International 
Development Association, which accounts for 33 percent of multilateral organizations’ total commitments (mostly 
loans) in the same period. 
13 EU institutions showed a low coverage of disbursements prior to 2005, whereas United Kingdom showed 
disbursement to commitment data greater than one in 2010 and 2011. 
14
 We grouped the multilateral donors in three categories: (i) European Institutions; (ii) UN Institutions and 
Development Banks with complete information (AfDB, AfDF, IBRD, IDA, IMF Concessional Trust Funds, UNAIDS, 
UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, and UNRWA), and (iii) Other multilateral donors without complete information (OSCE, 
GAVI, GEF, Global Fund, WFP, WHO, Arab Fund-AFESD, AsDB Special Funds, BADEA, EBRD, IDB Special Fund, IFAD, 
Islamic Development Bank, Nordic Development Fund, OFID, UNECE, UNHCR, and UNPBF). 
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activities. After dropping the ODA loan-related activities, there were 1,393,542 observations 
with information about disbursements.15 
Preliminary analysis suggested that different donors react differently to the need for 
disaster-related emergency aid, and we therefore focus on all the largest donors and examine 
them separately. We kept the data for the largest six donors from the DAC countries (France, 
Germany, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States) and two multilateral donor 
groups (EU Institutions, and Development Banks and UN Institutions). Overall, these six 
countries and two groups account for 766,613 records, whose disbursement activity sum about 
75 percent of the total ODA disbursements. Details about the breakdown of these 
disbursements by the eight donors (six countries and two multilateral groupings) are provided 
in Figure 2.16  
Next, we kept information based on the recipient countries record. Out of the 748,778 
records with non-zero information about disbursements, 104,541 records (13.6 percent) were 
related to regional or unspecified recipients. We dropped those records.17 The next step was to 
collapse the events by donor-recipient-year-sector category. The collapsed dataset has 46,199 
observations, with information about 159 recipient countries.18 The number of recipient 
countries varies by donor: Japan is the donor with the most recipients (it is linked to 133 
countries), whereas the United Kingdom is the one with the lowest number (47 recipient 
countries). 
We dropped eight countries that are of particular interest for the large donors and show 
very different patterns in aid trends. These are: Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Republic of 
                                                             
15
 Loans – even with a large grant component in the form of concessionary interest rate – are not equivalent to 
grants, and measuring the concessionary part will potentially insert biases into our data. Accounting for the timing 
and maturities of the loans inserts an additional dimension into our analysis. 
16
 Figure 2 also includes this data without the debt relief component; we describe this in more detail below. 
17
 We drop additional records for France in 2004 and 2005, since they seem as double counting disbursements of 
the sector 930 (refugees in donor countries). This problem occurs in 2005, where humanitarian aid sector and 
development aid sectors showed abnormal changes with respect to their historical behavior. After comparing the 
dataset with the aggregates reported in the Table DAC 2A, we found regularities in the abnormal increases in 
humanitarian aid and development food aid disbursements for those years that led us to modify 31 activities for 
the development food aid sector and drop 160 records for the humanitarian aid sector.  
18 There were some countries with very few observations (e.g. Malta only has three records in the dataset). We 
dropped any donor-recipient combination with less than 30 observations (an ad-hoc low threshold). The resulting 
dataset includes 40,735 observations for 144 recipient countries. 
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Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, and the Ex-Yugoslavian States. As Figure 3A 
shows, most of the upward trend observed in the largest donors is explained by the activities of 
donor countries in those countries. In addition to those countries, we dropped some ODA 
sectors: Administrative Costs of Donors (910) and Unallocated/Unspecified (998). Except for 
Netherlands aid activities, these sectors represent a small share of total disbursements.19 We 
also dropped the Action Relating to Debt (600), since in 2006 the Heavily indebted poor 
countries (HIPC) initiative represents an abnormal jump in the aid flows from the multilateral 
organizations – see Figure 3B.20 The number of non-zero observations in this dataset is 




3.2     Disaster Data 
Almost all the empirical work on natural disasters relies on the publicly available Emergency 
Events Database (EM-DAT) maintained by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of 
Disasters (CRED) at the Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium (http://www.emdat.be/). EM-
DAT defines a disaster as a natural situation or event that overwhelms local capacity and/or 
necessitates a request for external assistance. For a disaster to be entered into the EM-DAT 
database, at least one of the following criteria must be met: i) 10 or more people are reported 
killed; ii) 100 people are reported affected; iii) a state of emergency is declared; or iv) a call for 
international assistance is issued. Disasters can be hydro-meteorological, including floods, wave 
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 In order to avoid time scale effects, when we use measures that depend on ODA in levels (e.g. total aid or aid as 
percentage of GDP), we split the 910/998 disbursements between the remaining sectors proportional to their 
original shares (this is only of empirical importance for the Netherlands). 
20
 We dropped Refugees in Donor Countries (930) sector; it is only reported for France in 2005. 
21
 We also dropped a few very small island-states for which we had no population data (Cook Islands, Montserrat, 
Nauru, St. Helena, Wallis & Futuna). 
22 To verify the integrity of our data construction process, we also compared CRS disbursements with the aggregate 
disbursements reported in the Table 2A by the DAC, which represents the aggregate official reports of bilateral 
disbursements from countries and institutions included in CRS. A figure comparing the aggregate disbursements by 
donor reported in both CRS and DAC 2A datasets is available upon request. The aggregate disbursements from EU 
Institutions show a systematic underreporting between 2002 and 2004, and since our final objective is to identify 
aid surges, we restrict the sample for EU Institutions to the period 2005–2011. Similarly, we set the sample for 
Japan disbursements to the period 2003–2011. 
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surges, storms, droughts, landslides and avalanches; geophysical, including earthquakes, 
tsunamis and volcanic eruptions; and biological, covering epidemics and insect infestations (the 
latter are very infrequent). 
The disaster impact data reported in the EM-DAT database consists of direct damages 
(e.g., value of damage to infrastructure, crops, and housing in current dollars), the number of 
people killed, and the number of people affected. As Cavallo and Noy (2011) observe, many of 
the events reported in this database are quite small and are unlikely to have any significant 
impact on aid disbursements and on the economy more generally. We therefore limit our 
investigation only to very large disasters and identify the largest using the algorithm described 
below.  
We started with the EM-DAT dataset by event between 2002 and 2011, including only 
hydro-meteorological and geophysical events (sudden-onset natural hazards).23  The total 
number of events was 3,055.24 Using the information on damages and mortality, we only kept 
events with more than 10 killed people and damages greater than 2011 US$ 10 MM: 1,485 
events. Next, we created the first list of the large catastrophic events, defined as the events for 
which the number of either total killed or killed to population ratio was greater than the 
respective sample average (611 killed and 24.14 killed per million inhabitants). This list of large 
catastrophic disasters has 72 events.25 For this list of large events, we created a new variable 
measuring media coverage, based on the AP archive website.  
We next collapsed the dataset from an event level to a country-year level,26 and 
aggregated the intensity variables over all the events occurring in the same country during the 
same year. The collapsed dataset had 66 year-country observations. Finally, from the 66 
country-year disaster observations, we chose the final list of large catastrophic event. First, we 
                                                             
23 Slowly evolving events are much more difficult to date (both their beginning and end) and to quantify their costs. 
They are also less clearly caused by natural hazards, and more related to government policy. While some of these 
issues are relevant to the analysis of sudden-onset events, the data problems are less severe in the latter case. 
24 Only 2,232 events had information about mortality and the number of affected people. We converted the 
monetary damage data into comparable 2011 US$ using US CPI data. 
25 We dropped one event in Taiwan because it did not have the other required information. 
26 If the event occurred in the last quarter of the year, we used the next year as the year of the disaster. 
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generated a ranking for each intensity variable: number of killed, killed to population ratio, and 
media coverage. Second, we generated an aggregate score that is the sum of the three 
mentioned rankings. Third, we defined a large catastrophic event as the top 25 events based on 
the composite score. After we merged this list with the available aid data, the list of usable 
large events includes 19 large disasters.27 The final list of catastrophic disasters, and their 
descriptive statistics, is available in Table 2. The table includes data on the number of people 
killed in each event, the number of killed as percentage of the population, and the media 
coverage (measured by the number of AP reports on the event). 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Aid after Catastrophic Disasters – Some Possibilities 
Several research projects have examined aid data from the donors’ perspective (e.g. Drury et 
al., 2005). Here, however, we are more interested in the recipients, their experience with 
obtaining aid after catastrophic events, and what these patterns imply for their incentives.28 For 
several of the disaster events in our sample (Bangladesh, Indonesia, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka) 
there are remarkable surges related to the catastrophic events we identified, and in some cases 
(e.g. Haiti) those increases are large enough to suggest that there may be cross-country 
reallocation in donor accounts – see Appendix Table 3. On the other hand, there are some 
catastrophic events that did not record an aid surge and that in general, received little aid that 
can be directly associated with the catastrophic event. Examples include the flood in the 
Dominican Republic in 2004, cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh (November 2007), and the China 
earthquake in 2010. 
The 2004 tsunami demanded the attention of all donors. In particular, there are two 
effects that are remarkable with the events related to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami: first, 
most of the donors reported increases in humanitarian aid to the most affected countries –
                                                             
27
 We dropped three events because they do not correspond with the CRS data (Japan 2011, United States 2005 
and American Samoa 2009) and three events that occurred in countries with abnormal levels of aid inflows – aid 
that is likely not motivated mostly because of humanitarian concerns (Afghanistan 2002 and Pakistan 2006 and 
2010). 
28 We later also examine the biggest donors’ patterns, but only given the importance of understanding their 
behavior from the recipients’ perspective. 
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Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Second, the duration of the associated aid surges for these countries is 
longer than the typical post-disaster aid surge; a review of the narrative description of aid 
projects reveals that there are additional aid-funded activities up to 2009, especially 
reconstruction expenditures.29 
Because of the richness of information of CRS and EM-DAT datasets, there are different 
ways to analyze the effect of a catastrophic event on bilateral aid. The first thing we should 
discuss is how different effects in aid should look like, and in the next section, look for those 
patterns in the data. The response of bilateral aid after a catastrophic event depends on the 
interaction of two different effects: (1) Complementarities between donors; donors coordinate 
the necessary actions to meet the aid requirements of a particular recipient country. (2) 
Reallocation between recipients and sectors. Becerra et al. (2013), conclude that the overall aid 
inflows in the aftermath of a disaster event are fairly limited (relative to disaster magnitude), so 
the evidence of the complementarity effect is fairly limited. We therefore focus on the second 
type of dynamics. 
Let us assume that a catastrophic event occurred in the country    at period   , and 
assume further that donor   decides to increase the bilateral aid to   . Then, at the recipient 
country level, the response of total aid from donor   must be one of the following three cases: 
(1) The aggregate ODA from that donor does not increase because of cross-recipient 
reallocation. After the catastrophic event, the donor reallocates the current ODA resources 
from other recipients to   ;30 (2) aggregate ODA increases in the same amount than the 
increase in ODA for recipient   ; i.e., no cross-recipient reallocation; and (3) neither aggregate 
ODA nor ODA for the recipient country increases; we call this possibility cross-sector 
reallocation. The donor country does not reallocate resources across recipients, but instead it 
provides humanitarian aid by reallocating ODA from recipient   ’s aid previously provided for 
other sectors. These three possibilities are presented diagrammatically in Figure 4. 
                                                             
29
 The 2004 South-East Asia tsunami was also the first event, apparently, in which private donations were larger 
than the sum of official aid flows (from both bi-lateral and multi-lateral sources) – see Athukorala (2012). 
30 This type of response may be explained, for example, because aid response after catastrophic events tends to be 
immediate, and so it may be administratively/institutionally easier to reallocate resources across recipients than 
get additional funding approved for emergency relief. 
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4.2. Post-Disaster Aid Data: Cross-Country Reallocation 
We next consider all the aid surges for all the donor-recipient pairs, and specifically in 
conjunction with the occurrence of a large catastrophic event.31 We define an aid surge as the 
difference between the aid flows for the year the disaster occurred and the average aid flows in 
the two years preceding the event. The full data is presented in Appendix Table 3, with shaded 
rows denote the cases in which the aid surge ranks in the top 5 percent of aid surges (either the 
same year or one year after the event). We summarize this data in Figure 5, which plots the 
distribution of all the aid surges in the dataset, and specifically highlight the aid surges that are 
associated with catastrophic natural disasters. Even in the aftermath of the largest catastrophic 
events, not all the donors react with large (abnormal) increases in aid to the disaster-hit 
country recipient. Not surprisingly, the most remarkable aid surges are related to the largest 
four catastrophic events (in terms of absolute mortality levels): the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the 
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, and Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar. The US 
response to the aftermath of the 2010 Haiti earthquake is the highest surge in absolute value 
(2010 US$ 815 Million, 3.8 times higher than the previous two years average).  
Even though we observe large increases in ODA for some of the large disasters, most of 
them are not large compared with the level of the total ODA activities of a donor country. We 
identified, in Figure 5 (and Appendix Table 3), 25 recipient-donor pairs as large aid surges out of 
a possible 118. We also find that the increases in total ODA to the recipient tend to be low 
when compared to the increase in the aggregate ODA from that donor in most cases. This 
pattern, of course, suggests that the cross-country reallocation is typically not an observed 
pattern, but it also suggests that donor countries do not seem to mobilize all available 
resources even in the aftermath of quite catastrophic events (for the affected countries). Table 
3 below shows the largest aid surges highlighted in Figure 5, and compares them to the change 
in the total ODA by donor (relative to the previous two year average) for the same year. After a 
large surge, the median increase in ODA by recipient was 2010 US$ 39.5 MM, whereas the 
median increase in total ODA by donor was 2010 US$ 308.4 MM. As a proportion of the change 
                                                             
31 Our selection of catastrophic events was explained in section 3.2. 
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in total ODA, the median change in ODA by recipient represented 5.5 percent of the total 
change by donor country.  
In summary, after the occurrence of a catastrophic event, not all the donors increase 
ODA in an abnormal way; moreover, the increase in ODA is typically smaller than the one 
observed for the aggregate ODA – except for the cases of Haiti-EU Institutions (2010), Haiti-
United States (2010), Sri Lanka-United States (2005) and Maldives – Japan (2005). In addition, 
the evidence suggests that the donor cross-country reallocation of foreign aid to channel more 
aid to an affected country is low. 
 
4.3. Post-Disaster Aid Data: Humanitarian Aid  
The CRS dataset classifies the bilateral aid flows according to their intended sector (social, 
infrastructure, etc.). We would like to describe the sectoral composition of post-disaster aid 
surges; i.e., we ask what are the sectoral characteristics of this aid. We considered only the 
sectors with the largest share in total aid activities from the largest donors we already 
identified. The relative importance of the sectors varies between the donors, but for 
consistency we examine the same five biggest sectors for all donors. These sectors are: social 
infrastructure and services, economic infrastructure and services, production sectors, 
humanitarian aid, and multi-sector.32 33 
We separate the analysis by donor country, having a two dimensional panel dataset for 
each donor country (recipient/year, whereas aid in each sector becomes the variable of 
interest). Implicitly, we are assuming in this analysis that the aid decision is donor-driven and 
                                                             
32
 The three sectors we do not include are: budget support/other commodity aid, development food aid/food 
security assistance, and actions relating to debt.  
33
 For the United States, 2002 and 2010 were abnormal years. Even after we removed Pakistan from our sample 
(because of its role in the war in Afghanistan), US disbursements in 2002 had a large share of “unspecified” 
humanitarian aid for Indonesia (7 percent of total). Second, there was a large amount of resources focused on the 
relief of Haiti’s earthquake (45 percent of the total of 2010). Because of these dramatic deviations from status-quo 
for the sector shares, the main conclusions regarding sectorial allocations are related to the period 2003-2009. In 




that donors do not coordinate their aid disbursements. In what follows, the analysis is carried 
out by group of recipients given a donor.  
We start by examining the impact of an event (a catastrophic disaster in a recipient) on 
humanitarian aid. This examination is both interesting in and of itself, and important since a lot 
of the empirical research on disaster aid cited earlier only uses humanitarian aid flows, 
implicitly assuming that only these flows are related to post-disaster assistance. Using a similar 
approach than the one used in the previous section, we analyze the aid surges for the 
humanitarian aid sector in the aftermath of a catastrophic event. The full results of these 
tabulations are presented in Appendix Table 4 below. In Figure 6, we again plot the distribution 
of humanitarian aid surges, while highlighting all the recipient-donor pairs for the large 
catastrophic events previously identified. For these, we compute the humanitarian aid surges, 
and compare them to the overall change in ODA for the same period.  
The data suggests there is an occasional shift of the donors, in the aftermath of 
catastrophic events in recipient countries, towards humanitarian aid; and this increase is more 
frequently done accompanied both by an overall increase in aid but with some cross-sector 
reallocation. On one hand, while there are few cases considered as large aid surges in aggregate 
ODA, humanitarian aid tends to show large aid surges in many of the countries with large 
catastrophic events. Out of the total 118 pairs listed in Figure 6 (and Appendix Table 4), 20 
humanitarian aid surges are greater than the percentile 95 of the humanitarian aid surge 
distribution by donor, and for 25 events the recipient countries were not receiving any 
humanitarian aid before the catastrophic event.34 Second, many of the cases in which an overall 
aid surge is identified as large do not coincide with a large aid surge in humanitarian aid. Out of 
the 25 events we previously classified as a large aid surge, 12 are in the top 5 percent of the 
humanitarian aid surge distribution.  
Third, for the largest catastrophic events, the changes in humanitarian aid are more 
than half the change in total ODA; in general, this percentage tends to increase with the 
                                                             
34 This is the particular case of the response of the 2010 earthquake in Chile, where the four donors included in the 




intensity of the event. For Japan’s foreign aid provision, the change in humanitarian aid is larger 
than the change in the total ODA, providing suggestive evidence of cross-sector reallocation. 
For the first four large catastrophic events, the change in the Japanese humanitarian aid is at 
least of the same magnitude than the change in total ODA. Similarly, the change in 
humanitarian aid accounts for almost 60 percent of the change in total ODA from other donors, 
but the importance of the change in humanitarian aid over the total change in ODA is smaller as 
the intensity of the event falls. The exception to this trend is the Chilean case, for which the 
ranking of the event is relatively low, but the change in humanitarian aid accounts for the main 
part of the total change in ODA.  
To summarize this section, while humanitarian aid is on some occasions the main driver 
for a post-disaster aid surge, in many cases it is not. There are many cases in which a donor 
country did increase its post-disaster aid without a surge in humanitarian aid being observed, 
and equally instances in which humanitarian aid surged but total bilateral aid did not as the 
donor country cross-allocated funds from other sectors to humanitarian assistance. As such, 
using humanitarian aid in an investigation of post-disaster aid patterns is at best incomplete, 
and at worse misleading. 
 
4.4. Cross-Sector Post Disaster Aid Patterns 
If examining humanitarian aid by itself is not sufficient in order to understand post-disaster aid 
patterns, the next step is to more fully describe the sectoral allocation of aid in post-disaster 
environments, by donor. Some sectors have a consistent large share across the donor countries 
we observe. Though the shares varied between donor countries, four sectors were the most 
prominent across these donors:  Social infrastructure and services, economic infrastructure and 
services, production sectors, and multi-sector/cross-cutting activities. Given our interests in the 
role of post-disaster aid in total aid flows, we also included in the analysis the humanitarian aid 




In order to analyze the donor’s choice of how to allocate aid after a catastrophic event, 
an appealing approach is to study a version of Balassa’s relative comparative advantage index, 
that we will call the Relative Importance (RI) index. For each pair of donor-recipient (   ), the RI 
index is defined as the ratio between the disbursements’ share for a specific sector in a 
recipient country, and the total share of aid of the donor country in the same sector. Formally, 
our RI index is defined as: 
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where   and   stand for the sector and time indexes.  
The RI index is suitable for our analysis because it summarizes in one number two 
different dimensions of our data: on one hand, it quantifies the importance of a specific sector 
in the total aid of a recipient country. On the other hand, it compares this share relative to the 
same share for a reference group of countries. Moreover, the RI index has a clear reference 
point: a value of RI greater than one implies that compared with the other countries in our 
sample, country   is receiving more aid in that specific sector, and so the countries with a 
       
    are the countries in which the donor focuses their aid for that sector. 
Consider, for example, the humanitarian aid sector in a particular country after the 
occurrence of a catastrophic event. In this case, an increase in the RI index implies that the 
change in humanitarian aid for a given country is larger than the variation in the total share that 
the donor country disbursed as humanitarian aid for all the reference countries.35 This is 
particularly useful in cases in which there was more than one catastrophic event per year, for 
example, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, in which Indonesia and Sri Lanka received more 
humanitarian aid than India and Thailand.  
4.4.1 Dynamics of aid across sectors 
                                                             
35 Essentially, this can be read as the donor country ‘revealing’ what recipient countries it prefers to support. 
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The basic bivariate cross correlation coefficient provides an alternative way of analyzing the 
patterns of post-disaster aid flows. We compute the cross correlation coefficient as 
    (       
           
 )  
 
| |
∑     (  
      
    




where | | stands for the number of countries with a non zero correlation coefficient (i.e. 
countries which have a non constant value of        
  across the sample). The set of correlation 
coefficients for each donor country, allows us to identify some patterns in the cross-sectoral 
allocation; we focus on the main five aid sectors: Social infrastructure (100), Economic 
infrastructure (200), production sectors (300), multi-sector/cross-cutting (400), and 
humanitarian aid (700). 
Figure 7 shows a summary of the estimated correlation coefficients for all donors. We 
display the range between the largest and smallest correlation coefficient obtained for each 
pair of sectors, pooling all the donor countries. The panel located at the first row and fifth 
column, for example, displays the correlation coefficients between the RI index for social 
infrastructure and lags of the RI index for humanitarian aid. In the first range (at lag 0), the 
graph displays the range of the maximum and minimum correlation coefficient estimated by 
donor for between those two sectors (-0.25 for Netherlands and -0.59 for United States). Figure 
7 makes evident some patterns in the data. Humanitarian aid flows tend to be uncorrelated 
with their past: the range of the autocorrelation coefficients for all countries is roughly 
centered around zero for all lags, and show the smallest dispersion among the autocorrelation 
of all sectors (graphs located at the main diagonal of Figure 7). Thus, a shock in the 
humanitarian aid sector tends to be short lived, lasting about one year. Even though this may 
be the case for other sectors (for example the economic infrastructure (200) sector), the range 
of the correlation is wider for them, suggesting that at least for some donors, there is 
persistence in the level of aid focused on these particular sectors. This is not surprising, as many 
ODA projects may be investment projects lasting more than one year, whereas the 
humanitarian aid is designed for short-run response. If any, the RI for humanitarian aid showed 
a negative contemporaneous correlation (between -0.6 and -0.25) with the social infrastructure 
sector, and does not show a definite pattern with changes in the other considered sectors. 
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Finally, correlation between humanitarian aid and changes in the other sectors was low in the 
subsequent observations.  
A more formal approach to examine the dynamic relationship between the different 







          
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
















     
      
      
      
       
  
    
       
       
      
      
  
    
       
       
      
      
  
    
       
       
      
      
  
    
       
       
      















            
 
           
 
           
 
           
 







































         
 
        
 
        
 
        
 










where      is a dummy variable indicating whether a catastrophic event occurred, and 
      
      
        
  is the composite error term, the sum of the individual unobserved term     
  
and the error term       
 . Because the previous analysis suggests a low level of persistence, and 
the time series is short (10 years), we include only one lag (p=1). 36 
We investigate the impulse response functions; the response of the system given a 
shock in the catastrophic event variable (    ). This examination enables us to identify if there 
was contemporaneous effect in the other sectors, and how it is typically transmitted to other 
sectors. Given a shock in the catastrophic event indicator, the average response of the RI index 
of the humanitarian sector is positive and significant only for United States and EU Institutions – 
the two largest donors in our sample. For these two donors, the contemporaneous response of 
the RI index of the social infrastructure and sectors is negative and significant, and for the US, 
the contemporaneous response of the RI index for the production-sectors sector is also 
negative and significant. Although not significant, the negative contemporaneous response of 
the RI index for the social infrastructure sector is observed in other four cases (Germany, Japan, 
Netherlands, and United Kingdom), which suggests that, to the extent that there is some cross 
sectorial reallocation, the reallocation seems to be stronger between the infrastructure to 
humanitarian aid sectors (Appendix Figure 1).  
                                                             
36 We estimate the reduced form of equation by using the Dynamic Panel GMM estimator equation by equation 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991), and compute the impulse response functions for a shock in the exogenous variable      
as in Lütkepohl (2005) for the VAR case.  
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4.6. Panel VAR for aid across sectors in a response to a disaster event 
 In the previous section, we examined the impact of a change (shock) in one type of aid flow on 
other sectorial aid flows originating from the same donor country (and aggregated across 
disaster events). In this next step, we use similar panel VARs to investigate the impact of a 
disaster event on all types of aid flows (from the same donor). Before we present the PVAR 
results, however, it is worth noting from a before-after comparison that even though there is 
significant heterogeneity within each sector and donor, some observed patterns are 
noteworthy: Humanitarian aid increases in the year of the disaster for almost all donors, social 
infrastructure investment consistently falls for US in the year of the disaster, the humanitarian 
aid surge appears to last only one period, and there is no clear pattern for the other sectors and 
donors.37 
The response to a shock in the catastrophic event indicator variable is presented in the 
Figure 8 panels. We present the PVAR results for the five biggest aid flow sectors previously 
mentioned and separately for the largest eight donors in our sample. These five sectors satisfy 
three conditions: (1) They are important for the donor (the aggregate share by donor is large); 
(2) They are important for the recipients (the average share per recipient is large); and (3) They 
are important for the majority of recipients (the share is non-zero for the major part of the 
country-year observations).  
We find some evidence of partial re-allocation across sectors, but the data is fairly noisy, 
and this reallocation effect is statistically indistinguishable from the null of ‘no effect’ for most 
of the donor countries – see Figure 8 panels A-H. This re-allocation effect, however, does seem 
to be notable in the US data; i.e., from the five biggest donors, the US is the likeliest to reduce 
flows in other sectors once a disaster has an impact and humanitarian aid has increased.  
5. Conclusions, caveats and some comments on policy 
After examining the most detailed bilateral aid data available, we find three dominant patterns 
for aid in the aftermath of catastrophic disasters: First, the magnitudes and patterns of post 
                                                             
37 Figures presenting these patterns are available from the authors upon request. 
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disaster aid are not consistent, and are very different across donors and across disaster events. 
Second, there is little evidence that donors reduce their aid to other countries when they boost 
aid to a country that suffers a catastrophic event. Third, donors do sometime engage in cross-
sectoral substitution in the aftermath of an event, reducing their aid in other sectors 
(particularly infrastructure) while increasing it for humanitarian aid. This observation leads us to 
conclude that research efforts that rely only on data for humanitarian assistance are mis-
measuring the amount that affected countries receive in the aftermath of disasters.  
Potentially most importantly, an issue we have not explored sufficiently here is the 
dramatic difference between aid promises and actual disbursements; an example is the Haitian 
post-quake aid with only 62% disbursement rate.38 Equally important is Becerra et al. (2013) 
finding that generally the aid surges that follow disasters are not sufficient to cover the 
disasters’ costs.  
Another important question, of course, is not how much aid arrives in a disaster-stricken 
country, but rather what does the aid that does arrive accomplish. Generally, it is not well 
documented that aid reaches its intended recipients, and supports the projects that are most 
worthy of support (in the sense of generating the most desirable outcomes). Ultimately, the 
desire is to place affected communities on a long-term sustainable path of prosperity. Whether 
aid assists in that process, if it indeed occurs, is not really known. The copious research on aid 
and growth more generally allows one to be skeptical, but the circumstances of post-disaster 
aid are quite different, and we believe that that conclusion would be unwarranted. Overall, 
however, it seems that in any case the aid that does arrive is not sufficient, and successful 
reconstructions cannot depend on aid alone. 
The fact that post-disaster aid is unpredictable, and countries suffering disasters have 
quite a heterogeneous experience with post-disaster aid receipts, imposes its own costs. Aid 
becomes both uncertain and volatile. As Agénor and Aizenman (2010) have shown, this 
uncertainty and volatility leads in itself to inefficient policy choices among recipient countries.  
                                                             
38 Data that can permit us to reach definite conclusions regarding the difference between disbursements and 
commitments is not easily available (since the data on disbursement is not directly comparable to the commitment 
data – see Tierney et al., 2011). 
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We view this paper as the “opening shot” in a larger research effort to understand post-
disaster reconstruction.  In this paper we have not yet directly addressed any of the important 
normative issues that are connected to post-disaster aid. For example, we have not asked what 
is the optimal size or composition of foreign aid for recovery/reconstruction purposes in post-
disaster situations, or more broadly what is the best mix of pre-disaster risk prevention and 
mitigation, risk acceptance, and post-disaster efforts in reconstruction in case a disaster does 
hit.  
A different set of questions, and one that has not really been tackled in any comparative 
way, focuses on identifying the most productive ways in which post-disaster aid should be 
disbursed (quickly as a lump-sum or sequenced over time? in-kind or in-cash?). Observers have 
pointed out that large aid surges lead to higher prices and may therefore be less effective. Is 
this indeed the case? Should aid nevertheless concentrate on reconstructing as quickly as 
possible, in spite of the higher costs? What about the trade-off between quickly rebuilding what 
was there before and a slower ‘build back better’ process that also accounts for newly exposed 
hazards and vulnerabilities and attempts to develop more resilient communities? We expect to 
see more research along these themes in the near future as the prominence of these events is 
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France 0.94 0.08 
Germany 0.90 0.05 
Japan 0.92 0.11 
Netherlands 0.96 0.25 
United Kingdom 1.06 0.51 
United States 0.87 0.11 
EU Institutions 0.65 0.28 
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1 Haiti (2010) 222,570 22,563.3 1,035 1 1 1 
2 Indonesia (2005) 166,623 741.8 615 2 5 5 
3 Myanmar (2008) 138,366 2,949.2 439 3 2 9 
4 Sri Lanka (2005) 35,399 1,827.5 452 6 3 8 
5 China P Rep (2008) 87,476 66.4 623 4 20 4 
6 Thailand (2005) 8,345 127.7 500 10 14 6 
7 Iran Islam Rep (2004) 26,796 398.7 130 7 10 18 
8 Haiti (2004) 5,419 597.1 80 12 6 27 
9 Indonesia (2006) 6,580 28.9 152 11 42 15 
10 India (2005) 17,589 15.9 307 9 48 12 
11 Samoa (2009) 143 786.5 102 47 4 22 
12 Guatemala (2006) 1,513 122.0 27 19 15 41 
13 Algeria (2003) 2,266 72.1 25 15 19 43 
14 Maldives (2005) 102 355.8 110 49 12 20 
15 Bangladesh (2008) 4,234 29.7 74 14 39 28 
16 China P Rep (2010) 4,659 3.5 373 13 59 11 
17 Haiti (2008) 529 55.1 127 41 24 19 
18 Dominican Rep (2004) 688 76.5 37 35 18 33 





Table 3: Post-Disaster Aid Surges 
Rank Event Donor 
Aid surge (2010 
USD, MM) 
ODA change by 
donor (2010 USD, 
MM) 
Aid surge as 
percentage of 
total ODA change 
1 Haiti (2010) Development Banks-UN 75.9 172.7 43.9 
  Haiti (2010) EU Institutions 180.3 -49.8 -361.9 
  Haiti (2010) France 104.6 213.4 49.0 
  Haiti (2010) Germany 32.8 99.3 33.1 
  Haiti (2010) Japan 52.3 851.7 6.1 
  Haiti (2010) United States 815.1 689.9 118.1 
2 Indonesia (2005) Germany 53.3 308.4 17.3 
3 Myanmar (2008) EU Institutions 35.0 640.5 5.5 
  Myanmar (2008) France 3.9 -446.7 -0.9 
  Myanmar (2008) Germany 8.1 319.3 2.5 
  Myanmar (2008) United Kingdom 59.5 402.7 14.8 
  Myanmar (2008) United States 59.3 2720.0 2.2 
4 Sri Lanka (2005) Development Banks-UN 41.0 795.4 5.2 
  Sri Lanka (2005) Germany 43.6 308.4 14.1 
  Sri Lanka (2005) Netherlands 39.5 263.1 15.0 
  Sri Lanka (2005) United States 37.8 -346.1 -10.9 
6 Thailand (2005) France/a 74.7 939.9 7.9 
  Thailand (2005) Netherlands/a 3.5 -234.6 -1.5 
8 Haiti (2004) Germany 4.4 282.5 1.6 
9 Indonesia (2006) Germany 91.6 183.9 49.8 
11 Samoa (2009) Development Banks-UN 3.4 310.9 1.1 
13 Algeria (2003) Germany 11.7 714.9 1.6 
14 Maldives (2005) Japan 22.1 20.4 108.3 
17 Haiti (2008) Germany/a 12.2 296.4 4.1 
19 Chile (2010) United States 11.2 689.9 1.6 
MEDIAN 39.5 308.4 5.5 
Notes: 
a. Figures are the reported for year after the catastrophic event occurred.  
b. Aid surge is the difference between the aid flows in the year the disaster occurred and the average aid flows in the two 
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Figure 3A: Total disbursements by donor, with/out selected countries 
 












Figure 4: Alternative Post-Disaster Aid Scenarios 
1. Cross-recipient reallocation 2. No cross-recipient reallocation 
  
















Figure 7: Cross correlation coefficients between RI indices for Social infrastructure (100), Economic 






Figure 8: Response of Aid (By Sector) to a Disaster Shock (as % of GDP) 
Figure 8A: France 
 




Figure 8C: Japan 
 





Figure 8E: United Kingdom 
 





Figure 8G: UN/Development Banks 
 





Appendix Table 1: Main characteristics of commitments data. Average 2002-2011 
ODA by region – share of total (percent) 
Total ODA Humanitarian Aid 
Africa 35.5 Africa 41.6 
- North of Sahara 3.3 - North of Sahara 1.0 
- South of Sahara 31.1 - South of Sahara 39.6 
- Regional 1.0 - Regional 1.0 
Americas 7.7 Americas 5.9 
- North & Central America 3.8 - North & Central America 4.1 
- South America 3.4 - South America 1.3 
- Regional 0.5 - Regional 0.4 
Asia 36.1 Asia 37.0 
- Far East Asia 10.2 - Far East Asia 5.2 
- Middle East 9.1 - Middle East 12.7 
- South & Central Asia 16.3 - South & Central Asia 18.5 
- Regional 0.5 - Regional 0.6 
Europe 4.8 Europe 2.4 
Oceania 1.2 Oceania 0.2 
Unspecified 14.7 Unspecified 12.9 
Main donors – share of total (percent) 
Total ODA Humanitarian Aid 
United States 28.1 United States 47.8 
Japan 15.4 United Kingdom 7.3 
Germany 9.7 Japan 5.1 
France 8.9 Netherlands 4.7 
United Kingdom 7.3 Canada 4.2 
Netherlands 5.5 Sweden 4.1 
Canada 3.2 Germany 4.1 
Spain 3.0 Norway 3.9 
Norway 2.8 Switzerland 3.2 
Sweden 2.8 France 3.0 
Main recipients – share of total (percent) 
Total ODA Humanitarian Aid 
Iraq 5.8 Sudan 9.2 
India 3.8 Iraq 6.9 
Afghanistan 3.3 Afghanistan 6.4 
Pakistan 3.0 Ethiopia 5.1 
Vietnam 2.8 Pakistan 4.9 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2.6 Congo, Dem. Rep. 3.6 
Nigeria 2.5 South of Sahara, regional 3.5 
Indonesia 2.5 West Bank & Gaza Strip 3.0 
Bangladesh 2.1 Somalia 2.9 
Ethiopia 2.1 Haiti 2.7 
Aid by sector/purpose – share of total (percent) 
Total ODA Humanitarian Aid 
Social Infrastructure & Services 38.4 Emergency Response 84.1 
Economic Infrastructure & Services 15.4 - Emergency food aid 25.1 
Production Sectors 7.5 - Emergency/distress relief 55.9 
Multi-Sector/Cross-Cutting 8.5 - Relief co-ordination and protection 3.1 
Budget Support/Other Commodity Aid 4.5 Reconstruction relief 13.1 
Dev. Food Aid/Food Security Ass. 1.4 Disaster prevention and preparedness 2.8 
Action Relating to Debt 9.7   
Humanitarian Aid 7.4   
Administrative Costs of Donors 3.4     
Refugees in Donor Countries 1.6     
Unallocated / Unspecified 2.1     
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Appendix Table 2: Humanitarian aid sector definitions 
 
  
Sector Purpose CRS Guidelines' Defintion
Material relief assistance and services
Shelter, water, sanitation and health services, supply of medicines 
and other non-food relief items; assistance to refugees and  
internally displaced people in developing countries other than for 
food or protection.
Emergency food aid
Food aid normally for general free distribution or special 
supplementary feeding programmes; short-term relief to targeted 
population groups affected by emergency situations.  Excludes 
non-emergency food security assistance programmes/food aid.
Relief co-ordination; protection and support services
Measures to co-ordinate delivery of humanitarian aid, including 
logistics and communications systems;  measures to promote 
and protect the safety, well- being, dignity and integrity of civilians 
and those no longer taking part in hostilities.  (Activities designed 
to protect the security of persons or property through the use or 
display of force are not reportable as ODA.)
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation
(This  relates  to  activities  during  and  
in  the  aftermath  of  an  emergency 
situation. Longer-term activities to 
improve the level of infrastructure or 
social services should be reported 
under the relevant economic and 
social sector codes.)
Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation
Short-term reconstruction work after emergency or conflict limited 
to restoring pre-existing infrastructure (e.g. repair or construction 
of roads, bridges and ports, restoration of essential facilities, such 
as water and sanitation, shelter, health care services); social and 
economic rehabilitation in the aftermath of emergencies to 
facilitate transition and enable populations to return to their 
previous livelihood or develop a new livelihood in the wake of an 
emergency situation (e.g. trauma counselling and treatment, 
employment programmes).
Disaster Prevention & Preparedness Disaster prevention and preparedness
Disaster risk reduction activities (e.g. developing knowledge, 
natural risks cartography, legal  norms for  construction); early  
warning  systems; emergency contingency stocks and 
contingency planning including preparations for forced 
displacement.
Source: OECD Guidelines for Reporting in CRS++ Format.
Note: Disaster Prevention & Preparedness does not include prevention of floods and conflicts. These are included in the purposes 41050 Flood prevention/control 
and 15220 Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution
Emergency Response 
(An emergency is a situation which 




Appendix Table 3: Catastrophic Disasters and Foreign Aid 












1 Haiti (2010) Development Banks-UN 126.37 75.85 2.50 
  Haiti (2010) EU Institutions 284.27 180.31 2.73 
  Haiti (2010) France 141.75 104.58 3.81 
  Haiti (2010) Germany 43.57 32.84 4.06 
  Haiti (2010) Japan 71.98 52.33 3.66 
  Haiti (2010) United States 1106.84 815.05 3.79 
2 Indonesia (2005) Development Banks-UN 23.05 2.71 1.13 
  Indonesia (2005) EU Institutions 82.90 n.a. n.a. 
  Indonesia (2005) France 13.14 0.25 1.02 
  Indonesia (2005) Germany 144.21 53.34 1.59 
  Indonesia (2005) Japan 322.05 121.47 1.61 
  Indonesia (2005) Netherlands 177.46 81.05 1.84 
  Indonesia (2005) United Kingdom 55.23 28.41 2.06 
  Indonesia (2005) United States 175.04 -28.09 0.86 
3 Myanmar (2008) Development Banks-UN 34.99 3.93 1.13 
  Myanmar (2008) EU Institutions 54.51 34.96 2.79 
  Myanmar (2008) France 4.85 3.92 5.20 
  Myanmar (2008) Germany 13.39 8.14 2.55 
  Myanmar (2008) Japan 48.81 9.53 1.24 
  Myanmar (2008) United Kingdom 73.03 59.46 5.38 
  Myanmar (2008) United States 73.18 59.29 5.27 
4 Sri Lanka (2005) Development Banks-UN 51.31 41.03 4.99 
  Sri Lanka (2005) EU Institutions 18.50 n.a. n.a. 
  Sri Lanka (2005) France 3.19 0.71 1.29 
  Sri Lanka (2005) Germany 68.48 43.61 2.75 
  Sri Lanka (2005) Japan 148.43 92.34 2.65 
  Sri Lanka (2005) Netherlands 62.82 39.51 2.70 
  Sri Lanka (2005) United Kingdom 6.97 -3.78 0.65 
  Sri Lanka (2005) United States 61.05 37.81 2.63 
5 China (2008) Development Banks-UN 60.68 10.74 1.22 
  China (2008) EU Institutions 55.61 4.04 1.08 
  China (2008) France 161.51 -12.48 0.93 
  China (2008) Germany 365.80 7.21 1.02 
  China (2008) Japan 325.63 -64.22 0.84 
  China (2008) Netherlands 17.88 -14.00 0.56 
  China (2008) United Kingdom 75.62 12.41 1.20 
  China (2008) United States 66.66 35.23 2.12 
6 Thailand (2005) Development Banks-UN 8.21 2.81 1.52 
  Thailand (2005) EU Institutions 22.91 n.a. n.a. 
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  Thailand (2005) France/c 101.24 74.70 3.81 
  Thailand (2005) Germany 22.17 -4.10 0.84 
  Thailand (2005) Japan 83.26 -9.02 0.90 
  Thailand (2005) Netherlands/c 10.32 3.52 1.52 
  Thailand (2005) United States 26.59 0.00 1.00 
7 Iran (2004) Development Banks-UN 6.44 -3.60 0.64 
  Iran (2004) France 18.55 6.16 1.50 
  Iran (2004) Germany 46.05 1.32 1.03 
  Iran (2004) Japan 36.55 14.75 1.68 
8 Haiti (2004) Development Banks-UN 12.43 4.72 1.61 
  Haiti (2004) France 24.17 10.11 1.72 
  Haiti (2004) Germany 8.57 4.45 2.08 
  Haiti (2004) Japan 6.82 1.03 1.18 
  Haiti (2004) United States 105.20 6.53 1.07 
9 Indonesia (2006) Development Banks-UN 28.62 6.55 1.30 
  Indonesia (2006) EU Institutions 153.41 70.51 1.85 
  Indonesia (2006) France 21.02 7.46 1.55 
  Indonesia (2006) Germany 206.50 91.57 1.80 
  Indonesia (2006) Japan 192.41 -44.46 0.81 
  Indonesia (2006) Netherlands 161.60 25.92 1.19 
  Indonesia (2006) United Kingdom 81.42 40.49 1.99 
  Indonesia (2006) United States 225.69 44.82 1.25 
10 India (2005) Development Banks-UN 78.31 14.94 1.24 
  India (2005) EU Institutions 215.86 n.a. n.a. 
  India (2005) France 16.34 -1.40 0.92 
  India (2005) Germany 158.98 8.32 1.06 
  India (2005) Japan 37.13 8.68 1.31 
  India (2005) Netherlands 82.86 -29.18 0.74 
  India (2005) United Kingdom 394.38 22.26 1.06 
  India (2005) United States 181.23 -10.07 0.95 
11 Samoa (2009) Development Banks-UN 4.70 3.43 3.70 
  Samoa (2009) Japan 15.07 6.84 1.83 
12 Guatemala (2006) Development Banks-UN 3.50 -1.17 0.75 
  Guatemala (2006) EU Institutions 35.38 0.92 1.03 
  Guatemala (2006) France 3.99 1.75 1.78 
  Guatemala (2006) Germany 21.29 0.69 1.03 
  Guatemala (2006) Japan 45.91 18.99 1.71 
  Guatemala (2006) Netherlands 22.14 -5.10 0.81 
  Guatemala (2006) United States 95.48 14.62 1.18 
13 Algeria (2003) Development Banks-UN 3.90 0.60 1.18 
  Algeria (2003) France 154.76 26.78 1.21 
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  Algeria (2003) Germany 15.56 11.67 4.00 
  Algeria (2003) Japan 1.46 n.a. n.a. 
  Algeria (2003) United States 3.79 -2.42 0.61 
14 Maldives (2005) Development Banks-UN 9.17 7.04 4.32 
  Maldives (2005) Japan 28.84 22.07 4.26 
15 Bangladesh (2008) Development Banks-UN 53.41 6.24 1.13 
  Bangladesh (2008) EU Institutions 181.38 74.19 1.69 
  Bangladesh (2008) France 0.92 -1.49 0.38 
  Bangladesh (2008) Germany 61.57 24.22 1.65 
  Bangladesh (2008) Japan 68.26 11.66 1.21 
  Bangladesh (2008) Netherlands 78.51 -8.40 0.90 
  Bangladesh (2008) United Kingdom 225.85 40.08 1.22 
  Bangladesh (2008) United States 137.04 53.15 1.63 
16 China (2010) Development Banks-UN 78.55 8.14 1.12 
  China (2010) EU Institutions 42.59 -5.76 0.88 
  China (2010) France 180.54 11.70 1.07 
  China (2010) Germany 352.73 -12.61 0.97 
  China (2010) Japan 360.21 42.83 1.13 
  China (2010) Netherlands 5.64 -6.99 0.45 
  China (2010) United Kingdom 54.92 -22.12 0.71 
  China (2010) United States 86.46 26.46 1.44 
17 Haiti (2008) Development Banks-UN 38.85 5.66 1.17 
  Haiti (2008) EU Institutions 109.59 14.45 1.15 
  Haiti (2008) France 34.55 1.87 1.06 
  Haiti (2008) Germany/c 16.16 12.16 4.03 
  Haiti (2008) Japan 13.46 5.55 1.70 
  Haiti (2008) United States 264.19 55.83 1.27 
18 Dominican Rep. (2004) Development Banks-UN 3.82 0.98 1.35 
  Dominican Rep. (2004) France 2.74 0.47 1.21 
  Dominican Rep. (2004) Germany 11.87 3.26 1.38 
  Dominican Rep. (2004) Japan 19.06 -7.79 0.71 
  Dominican Rep. (2004) United States 34.04 -6.74 0.83 
19 Chile (2010) Development Banks-UN 4.21 -0.40 0.91 
  Chile (2010) EU Institutions 16.15 7.96 1.97 
  Chile (2010) France 14.47 1.83 1.14 
  Chile (2010) Germany 27.04 0.17 1.01 
  Chile (2010) Japan 17.06 6.46 1.61 
  Chile (2010) United States 13.25 11.22 6.53 
Notes:  
a. Aid surge is the difference between the aid flows in the year the disaster occurred and the average aid flows in the two years preceding 
the catastrophic event. 
b. Shaded rows denote events for which there was a large increase in aid. See text for details.  
c. Figures are the reported for one year after the catastrophic event occurred.  
49 
 
Appendix Table 4: Humanitarian aid surges for large disasters 






















1 Haiti (2010) Development Banks-UN 1.14 1.17 75.85 1.50 
  Haiti (2010) EU Institutions 106.32 3.05 180.31 58.97 
  Haiti (2010) France 25.92 40.72 104.58 24.78 
  Haiti (2010) Germany 26.06 5.83 32.84 79.36 
  Haiti (2010) Japan 54.73 44.93 52.33 104.58 
  Haiti (2010) United States 727.82 13.65 815.05 89.30 
2 Indonesia (2005) Development Banks-UN 0.00 n.a. 2.71 0.00 
  Indonesia (2005) EU Institutions n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
  Indonesia (2005) France 2.88 695.79 0.25 1165.35 
  Indonesia (2005) Germany 41.83 370.20 53.34 78.42 
  Indonesia (2005) Japan 163.06 +Inf 121.47 134.24 
  Indonesia (2005) Netherlands 113.65 19.26 81.05 140.21 
  Indonesia (2005) United Kingdom 13.51 +Inf 28.41 47.54 
  Indonesia (2005) United States 28.06 2.97 -28.09 -99.91 
3 Myanmar (2008) Development Banks-UN 1.10 8.46 3.93 28.02 
  Myanmar (2008) EU Institutions 21.56 3.09 34.96 61.68 
  Myanmar (2008) France 3.33 40.64 3.92 84.96 
  Myanmar (2008) Germany 7.84 3.99 8.14 96.31 
  Myanmar (2008) Japan 15.05 9.79 9.53 157.94 
  Myanmar (2008) United Kingdom 51.92 31.25 59.46 87.32 
  Myanmar (2008) United States 55.22 8.86 59.29 93.14 
4 Sri Lanka (2005) Development Banks-UN 0.69 3.47 41.03 1.67 
  Sri Lanka (2005) EU Institutions n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
  Sri Lanka (2005) France 0.61 3.62 0.71 85.22 
  Sri Lanka (2005) Germany 29.91 6.40 43.61 68.60 
  Sri Lanka (2005) Japan 92.53 1362.32 92.34 100.21 
  Sri Lanka (2005) Netherlands 27.39 4.81 39.51 69.31 
  Sri Lanka (2005) United Kingdom 2.47 3.70 -3.78 -65.26 
  Sri Lanka (2005) United States 32.02 16.93 37.81 84.69 
7 China (2008) Development Banks-UN 0.46 1.88 10.74 4.33 
  China (2008) EU Institutions 1.90 7.90 4.04 47.09 
  China (2008) France 1.70 +Inf -12.48 -13.63 
  China (2008) Germany 5.86 66.04 7.21 81.19 
  China (2008) Japan 6.24 +Inf -64.22 -9.71 
  China (2008) Netherlands 0.00 n.a. -14.00 0.00 
  China (2008) United Kingdom 2.75 +Inf 12.41 22.18 
  China (2008) United States 3.48 8.81 35.23 9.88 
8 Thailand (2005) Development Banks-UN 0.10 2.62 2.81 3.70 
  Thailand (2005) EU Institutions n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
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  Thailand (2005) France/c -0.08 0.13 74.70 -0.10 
  Thailand (2005) Germany 0.00 n.a. -4.10 0.00 
  Thailand (2005) Japan 0.00 n.a. -9.02 0.00 
  Thailand (2005) Netherlands/c 0.89 1.77 3.52 25.38 
  Thailand (2005) United States 2.46 6.77 0.00 -58349.49 
9 Iran (2004) Development Banks-UN 0.45 +Inf -3.60 -12.58 
  Iran (2004) France 3.77 83.76 6.16 61.18 
  Iran (2004) Germany -1.36 0.41 1.32 -102.85 
  Iran (2004) Japan 18.12 +Inf 14.75 122.85 
10 Haiti (2004) Development Banks-UN 0.39 +Inf 4.72 8.27 
  Haiti (2004) France 4.65 14.52 10.11 45.94 
  Haiti (2004) Germany 3.31 1158.36 4.45 74.36 
  Haiti (2004) Japan 0.00 n.a. 1.03 0.00 
  Haiti (2004) United States 4.50 2.89 6.53 68.93 
11 Indonesia (2006) Development Banks-UN 1.37 +Inf 6.55 20.88 
  Indonesia (2006) EU Institutions 57.48 2.37 70.51 81.53 
  Indonesia (2006) France -0.60 0.58 7.46 -8.04 
  Indonesia (2006) Germany 20.31 1.97 91.57 22.18 
  Indonesia (2006) Japan -75.03 0.08 -44.46 168.75 
  Indonesia (2006) Netherlands 10.51 1.17 25.92 40.57 
  Indonesia (2006) United Kingdom 10.49 2.55 40.49 25.90 
  Indonesia (2006) United States 69.83 4.26 44.82 155.79 
12 India (2005) Development Banks-UN 2.87 3.51 14.94 19.22 
  India (2005) EU Institutions n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
  India (2005) France 0.02 +Inf -1.40 -1.74 
  India (2005) Germany 6.79 8.85 8.32 81.51 
  India (2005) Japan 0.00 n.a. 8.68 0.00 
  India (2005) Netherlands -1.55 0.02 -29.18 5.31 
  India (2005) United Kingdom 3.71 2.49 22.26 16.68 
  India (2005) United States 1.64 1.21 -10.07 -16.33 
13 Samoa (2009) Development Banks-UN 0.16 +Inf 3.43 4.80 
  Samoa (2009) Japan 0.00 n.a. 6.84 0.00 
14 Guatemala (2006) Development Banks-UN -0.12 0.60 -1.17 10.19 
  Guatemala (2006) EU Institutions -4.60 0.54 0.92 -502.25 
  Guatemala (2006) France -0.62 0.00 1.75 -35.45 
  Guatemala (2006) Germany 0.08 1.15 0.69 11.74 
  Guatemala (2006) Japan -0.58 0.00 18.99 -3.04 
  Guatemala (2006) Netherlands -2.26 0.00 -5.10 44.20 
  Guatemala (2006) United States 8.96 4.25 14.62 61.25 
16 Algeria (2003) Development Banks-UN 0.00 n.a. 0.60 0.00 
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  Algeria (2003) France 5.56 35.39 26.78 20.76 
  Algeria (2003) Germany 0.78 2.46 11.67 6.66 
  Algeria (2003) Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
  Algeria (2003) United States -2.93 0.26 -2.42 121.50 
18 Maldives (2005) Development Banks-UN 0.57 2063.77 7.04 8.13 
  Maldives (2005) Japan 22.23 837.95 22.07 100.71 
19 Bangladesh (2008) Development Banks-UN -1.06 0.72 6.24 -16.92 
  Bangladesh (2008) EU Institutions 37.06 4.89 74.19 49.96 
  Bangladesh (2008) France -0.69 0.02 -1.49 46.54 
  Bangladesh (2008) Germany 0.33 1.17 24.22 1.37 
  Bangladesh (2008) Japan 10.46 6.28 11.66 89.69 
  Bangladesh (2008) Netherlands -2.63 0.37 -8.40 31.34 
  Bangladesh (2008) United Kingdom 4.91 1.70 40.08 12.25 
  Bangladesh (2008) United States 37.84 46.81 53.15 71.20 
20 China (2010) Development Banks-UN -0.15 0.88 8.14 -1.87 
  China (2010) EU Institutions -1.43 0.00 -5.76 24.88 
  China (2010) France -0.77 0.17 11.70 -6.56 
  China (2010) Germany 4.20 2.17 -12.61 -33.27 
  China (2010) Japan 0.27 1.09 42.83 0.62 
  China (2010) Netherlands 0.00 n.a. -6.99 0.00 
  China (2010) United Kingdom -1.40 0.39 -22.12 6.35 
  China (2010) United States -3.46 0.34 26.46 -13.09 
21 Haiti (2008) Development Banks-UN 0.11 1.02 5.66 1.96 
  Haiti (2008) EU Institutions 43.24 2.70 14.45 299.17 
  Haiti (2008) France 1.03 14.00 1.87 54.96 
  Haiti (2008) Germany/c 8.97 14.38 12.16 73.80 
  Haiti (2008) Japan 2.29 +Inf 5.55 41.30 
  Haiti (2008) United States 36.02 3.85 55.83 64.52 
23 Dominican Rep (2004) Development Banks-UN 0.29 +Inf 0.98 29.02 
  Dominican Rep (2004) France 0.34 27.08 0.47 72.74 
  Dominican Rep (2004) Germany 0.19 +Inf 3.26 5.93 
  Dominican Rep (2004) Japan 0.00 n.a. -7.79 0.00 
  Dominican Rep (2004) United States -0.01 0.92 -6.74 0.19 
24 Chile (2010) Development Banks-UN 0.07 +Inf -0.40 -17.03 
  Chile (2010) EU Institutions 4.15 141.73 7.96 52.12 
  Chile (2010) France 0.69 +Inf 1.83 37.90 
  Chile (2010) Germany 0.61 +Inf 0.17 352.07 
  Chile (2010) Japan 6.35 +Inf 6.46 98.26 




a. Aid surge is the difference between the aid flows in the year the disaster occurred and the average aid flows in the two years preceding 
the catastrophic event. 
b. Shaded rows denote events for which there was a large increase in total aid. See Appendix Table 3. 
c. Figures are the reported for one year after the catastrophic event occurred.  
d. '+Inf' refers to those cases in which there is positive disbursement in the year the event occurred, but the previous two years average 




Appendix Figure 1 - Response of RI index (By Sector) to a Disaster Shock 
Figure 1A: France 
 





Figure 1C: Japan 
 




Figure 1E: United Kingdom 
 
Figure 1F: United States 
 




Figure 1H: European Institutions 
 
